

AD-A039 625

ARMY INST FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUD--ETC F/G 15/3
WHO AFTER GRECHKO: SOVIET MILITARY SUCCESSION POSSIBILITY.(U)
FEB 76 D L GIDDENS

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 OF 1
ADAO39 625



END

DATE
FILMED
6-77

AD A 039625

①

US ARMY INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES



⑪ Feb 76 ⑫ 31p.

⑨

STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

⑥ WHO AFTER GRECHKO:
SOVIET MILITARY SUCCESSION
POSSIBILITY

⑩ Captain David L. Giddens

GARMISCH, GERMANY

APO NEW YORK 09053

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

DDC

MAY 18 1977

B

AD No. _____
DDC FILE COPY

410192

LB

WHO AFTER GRECHKO:
SOVIET MILITARY SUCCESSION POSSIBILITIES

Captain David L. Giddens

February 1976


ACCESSION	
NTIS	White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDO	Grey Section <input type="checkbox"/>
UNANNOUNCED	<input type="checkbox"/>
JULIAN GATTOR	
<i>Letter on file</i>	
BY	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES	
DISC.	AVAIL. 3RD/OF SPECIAL
A	

FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.


RICHARD P. KELLY
LTC, MI
Commander

↓ Leadership changes in the Communist hierarchy are expected with the approaching

SUMMARY

The entire world awaits with expectation the approaching 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976. Leadership changes in the Communist hierarchy have been reported in the West with growing frequency. This paper examines first the unique position of Marshal A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, who currently enjoys unprecedented power by combining his leadership of the vast Soviet Armed Forces with his membership on the Politburo of the Communist Party. Secondly, ^{Since} Marshal Grechko is 74 years old, and has been in the Soviet Army since 1919, He is obviously due for "retirement" in the relatively near future, ^{This situation} a fact which prompts the author's speculative search into the Soviet High Command to identify the most likely successor to Marshal Grechko. In other words, who will succeed Marshal Grechko in assuming a position that is at least potentially the most powerful in the Soviet Union?

CONTENTS

Foreward	ii
Summary	iii
Introduction	1
Historical Background	4
Military Succession Possibilities	8
Conclusion	21
Footnotes	23
Bibliography	25

INTRODUCTION

Today the Soviet Union controls much of the Eastern European and Northern Asian land masses; moreover, the traditional expansionist policy of the Soviet Union is currently achieving an expanding influence in all parts of the world. These facts are to a large degree the result of Soviet reliance on its military machine as a powerful factor in its external (and internal) policy determination. Further, the Soviet military today enjoys a far greater degree of continuous influence on government policy than at any time during the nation's turbulent history. The role played by the individual leader of the vast Soviet military apparatus has grown apace with the general importance of the military as a whole.

Since his appointment in 1967, Marshal A. A. Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defense, has achieved remarkable success in increasing his personal influence as well as in guiding the growing influence of the Soviet military. His somewhat controversial appointment to succeed Marshal Malinovskii, and his subsequent appointment to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1971) and finally to the Politburo of the Central Committee (1973), are indicative of the growing importance assigned by the Party, not only to the military establishment, but also to Marshal Grechko as an individual.¹

In support of this final point, it must be noted that the appointment of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo is a

"precedent" in Soviet politics which carries special significance. Except for the brief appointment of the immensely popular World War II leader, Marshal Zhukov, to the Politburo by Krushchev during the struggle for power in 1956, no professional military leader has been permitted to participate in the policy-making process of the exclusive proceedings of the Politburo, the most restricted and most powerful organ in the Soviet Union.²

Additionally, the Soviet military has developed into a massive and most influential segment of Soviet society which not only presents its particular secular demands and pressures on Soviet governmental policy decisions, but which also, because of universal conscription, affects the daily lives of the vast majority of Soviet citizenry through educational, economic and other social inter-relationships.³

The Soviet military is today a powerful organization in the traditional sense and also, at least potentially in a sociological interpretation, within the Soviet state itself. Its leader theoretically represents a power that exceeds that normally assigned to a military leader - a power which must be evaluated in the broadest sense in order to properly ascertain and appreciate realistic prospects for the future.

While the Soviet military today provides the Communist Party with an effective tool well suited to traditional military missions, it at the same time represents a poten-

tial sociological force with as yet untested powers of affecting the development of the Soviet state internally as well as externally. The approaching 25th Congress of the Communist Party (24 February 1976) and the concurrent advancing age of Marshal Grechko, present a timely stimulus to evaluate the current leadership of the Soviet military, and to rationally speculate on the possibilities for future leadership of the Soviet military. Who will succeed Marshal Grechko and what possible changes will result from this action? The answer to this question obviously carries major significance for the United States and indeed for the entire Free World.

In evaluating available data, the author has chosen to give primary importance to the manner in which Marshal Grechko came to power. It is acknowledged that in such an analysis, other schools of thought exist, such as giving primary importance to the need for a younger leader (even one without World War II experience) or giving primary importance to the need for a technology-oriented "specialist" to lead an increasingly complex Soviet military. However, the author feels that standard military values and the key positions occupied by Marshal Grechko, and to a lesser degree, Marshal Malinovskii, warrant the decisive roles in the tradition-minded Soviet system.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Communism, since its introduction by force of arms into Russia in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, has been closely tied to the Armed Forces. Having seized power with the aid, in part, of disenchanted soldiers, the Communists have continued to consolidate and increase this power largely due to the effective employment and, most importantly, the control of their military machine.⁴

The individual leadership of the armed forces was critically important to the political leaders of the new state, especially in terms of political reliability. The young "Soviet" Army developed initially under Trotskii's leadership and progressed through the early years of Civil War, "War Communism" and the New Economic Program with the ever present "assistance", or rather domination of military commanders by proven reliable political commissars.

Even before Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin had begun to consolidate his power base and to institute his severely repressive type of leadership. Stalin relied heavily on the military as well as the secret police to speed the industrialization of the Soviet economy and the collectivization of its agriculture. Therefore, as early as 1924, Stalin promoted the replacement of Frunze as military leader with the more malleable Voroshilov.⁵ Stalin early appreciated the need for a strong military with a powerful industrial base in order to insure survival of the Soviet

state in the approaching conflict with world capitalism. However, Stalin was at this same time acutely suspicious of the reliability of the Soviet military and in the purges of the mid 1930's, liquidated a large part of Soviet military leadership. Stalin's "cult of personality" was so overwhelmingly powerful that only for the short period during World War II during which military necessity dictated, did Marshal Zhukov succeed in truly "leading" the Soviet military against Hitler's Germany. Immediately after Germany was defeated, Stalin created the myth of his personal military genius and leadership at least in part to eliminate the possibility of Bonapartism by popular and successful military leaders like Zhukov. As a result, military leaders did not lead, but rather were permitted to lead and were tightly controlled. This absolute domination by Stalin continued through the post War/Cold War period to such a degree as to prohibit the development of a new military strategy based on the experiences of World War II and the appearance of the atomic bomb as a weapon of mass destruction.⁶

The death of Stalin in 1953 marks the beginning of a new era in the development of the role of the Soviet military and its leaders - an era that continues even today. One of the many important consequences of Stalin's death was the almost immediate removal of Beria and the accompanying general loss of terror-power by the Secret Police.

This period was also marked by a "thaw" in the

development of ideas and individuals/groups throughout the Soviet Union's realm of control. Externally the period 1953-1956 witnessed the events in East Germany, Poland and Hungary as satellites/peoples attempted to exploit the lessening of control. Internally, military leaders joined the ranks of those "rehabilitated" and among the major changes of this period, Marshal Zhukov reappeared to lead the military support for Krushchev in his struggle for power, first against Beria and the Secret Police, and then against Malenkov and the so-called "Anti-Party Group". Although Zhukov's rehabilitation was short-lived; under Krushchev, military leaders were no longer merely tolerated as they had been under Stalin. Krushchev actually accepted military counsel and advice and permitted the development of a new military strategy based on the realities of atomic warfare and ideological re-interpretations such as "peaceful coexistence".⁷ However, Krushchev provided a less than stable atmosphere for military development as he vacillated between total reliance on nuclear missiles with its inherent reductions in conventional forces, and his final acceptance of the need for a multi-force (traditional) military capability.

The years since the October, 1964 "Palace revolution" which deposed Krushchev and established the present collective leadership of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi, emphasized the structural changes relative to power which had occurred in the Soviet system since the time of Stalin.

Apparently, no longer was a single party leader capable of solely "picking up the reins of power". The then-recent Cuban Crisis had served to emphasize the error of conducting foreign policy while giving too little weight to professional military opinion (a thesis widely accepted by Western military experts). The advent of the nuclear and missile ages complicated the dangers of maintaining and controlling an already large and extremely complex military machine. The military role in the power struggles within the government gained new significance and illustrated the tremendous reliance of the Party on the military for support.

The Brezhnev hierarchy and the Party - the absolute power of the Soviet Union - have highly rewarded the military for its accomplishments and for its support. Brezhnev's collective leadership has provided a period of relative political stability in which the strength of the Soviet military has tremendously increased in terms of equipment, man-power and whatever material and political support the military has desired.⁸ Additionally, at least since 1967, when Marshal Grechko was appointed as Minister of Defense, the military leadership has gained a political power base unprecedented in Soviet history. In 1971, Marshal Grechko became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in 1973, the highly significant appointment of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo occurred. These appointments assume added significance when one

considers that in 1967, there was rumored debate on the appointment of a civilian (possibly Minister Ustinov) as Minister of Defense. Marshal Grechko's personal friendship with Brezhnev is a factor of unknown importance that may nonetheless be affecting the internal workings of the 16-member Politburo today.⁹

Finally, the military, as personified by its leadership, tends to be elitist, with a strong sense of solidarity and discipline. It further possesses vast physical power and a network of command capable of rapidly mobilizing that power. Marshal Grechko participates in decision-making at the highest levels of the Party and Government. He commands a military structure that is vast, complex, and permeates the whole of the Soviet people. Therefore, the Soviet Armed Forces constitute the most likely threat to the Communist Party's continued rule and hence must be tightly controlled. But at the same time, these controls must not be so close and so debilitating that the Armed Forces become unable to properly and effectively perform the tasks assigned them by the Party. This is briefly the situation confronting Marshal Grechko and his successor.¹⁰

MILITARY SUCCESSION POSSIBILITIES

Within the Soviet system, final authority rests in the Politburo of the Communist Party. One of the basic reasons for the relative absence of a competitive "power struggle" during the Brezhnev period has been the effect that the

"stability of cadres" policy has had on turnover within the Politburo (as the party Presidium has been called since the 23rd CPSU Congress in April, 1966). Between November, 1964, and April, 1971, only two individuals were promoted to full membership in the Politburo (Mazurov and Arvid Pelshe), neither of whom were serious contenders or occupied posts that could be considered launching sites for leadership.¹¹

At the same time, however, although there have been rumors and speculation that on several occasions Brezhnev may have attempted to follow Krushchev's example and to establish himself as the head of government as well as General Secretary of the Party, he has not in fact acquired this post. It does appear that he has assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces through chairmanship of the Defense Council.¹²

The extraordinary promotion of Andropov (State Security), Gromyko and Marshal Grechko to full membership in the Politburo at the April, 1973, Plenum of the Party Central Committee among other things, focused attention on the growing influence and political participation of military leaders.

In recent years, a clear indication of the Party's trust in its military leadership and its high evaluation of their judgment and ability has been the high degree of military representation in the Party's Central Committee (CC). At the 8 April 1971, election of the CC during the

24th Party Congress, 20 officers from the leading military circles were elected to full membership. This was an increase of six from the 23rd Party Congress of 1966, and a gain in overall percentage of 1.1 per cent (from 7.2 per cent to 8.3 per cent of total CC membership.) Among the eight generals elected to CC full membership for the first time were: General of the Army V. G. Kulikov, the new First Deputy Minister of Defense, and Chief of the General Staff; Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov, Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; and General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskii, Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces. Re-elected to full membership in the CC were such veterans as: Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko; Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Gorshkov; General of the Army A. A. Epishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy; and Marshal of the Soviet Union, I. I. Yakubovskii, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. It is interesting to note that of the 20 full military members, only General Epishev was from the political sphere. The dramatic increase in the number of military members in the CC seems to indicate an increasingly important role for the military.¹³

It is apparent that Marshal Grechko occupies a position of unique power for a professional military leader in the Soviet system. In addition to commanding the Soviet Armed Forces and serving as the Minister of Defense,

he also shares the highest political power of the Soviet Union by means of his membership (1973) in the Politburo. His position has brought duties that included not only the traditional military ones, but also political, diplomatic and even socio-economic areas of activity. However, Marshal Grechko has served as Minister of Defense since 1967 - just under nine years. He is now 72 years old and Western analysts have from time to time suggested that the combined burdens of advanced age and his major power responsibilities may cause his resignation in the relatively near future.¹⁴ The pending 25th Party Congress could present a suitable forum for his triumphant retirement and the concurrent appointment of his successor.

Power succession within the Soviet system presents a particularly difficult problem to Western analysts because of the scarcity of information concerning the inner workings of the Politburo. One cannot, therefore, accurately predict who will succeed to power in a given position. Nonetheless, a review of Soviet history and past practices may provide sufficient information for rational speculation as to the probabilities involved in the succession question. For example, the criteria for appointment to Minister of Defense probably have changed little since Marshal Grechko's appointment in 1967, in spite of the rather significant internal and external changes that have occurred during this period concerning the Soviet Union as a whole, and the Soviet military in

particular.

Aside from Marshal Grechko's personal relationship with Brezhnev during World War II, his previous assignments may serve as an indicator of the type of background required by the Politburo of its Minister of Defense. Working from this premise and recounting Grechko's previous major assignments, we find that he served as an Army Commander in World War II, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Troops in Germany, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union. Additionally, he has twice been awarded the "Hero of the Soviet Union", the highest decoration in the USSR for heroism. Finally, former Minister of Defense Malinovskii served as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense in addition to commanding various military districts and combined units.¹⁵

A listing of possible successors to Marshal Grechko would have to initially include the three First Deputy Ministers of the Soviet Union and all of the eleven Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Soviet Union. In addition to the early mentioned Kulikov, Kutakhov, Pavlovskii, Gorshkov, Epishev and Yakubovskii, the following individuals are included: First Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Army, S. L. Sokolov; Marshal of the Soviet Union, P. F. Batitskii (Air Defense); Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko (Combat Preparedness); General of the Army

S. K. Kurkotkin (Rear Services); Colonel General N. N. Alekseev; Colonel General A. T. Altunin (Civil Defense); Commander of Strategic Rocket Forces, General of the Army V. F. Tolubko; General of the Army N. V. Ogarkov; and Colonel General A. V. Gelovani.¹⁶

Finally, the present Commanders-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, General of the Army Y. F. Ivanovskii; the Kiev Military District, Colonel General G. I. Salmanov; and the Moscow Military District, Colonel General V. L. Govorov, should be included in this initial listing for two reasons. First, they are obviously senior Soviet military leaders with tremendous potential for future advancement. Secondly, each of these three officers currently occupies a post which has played a significant role in determining the past Soviet Military hierarchy. For example, Grechko, Yakubovskii, Kulikov and Kurkotkin have all served as Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Grechko, Yakubovskii and Kulikov have also served as Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev Military District.¹⁷

This initial listing of possible successors to Marshal Grechko may be immediately shortened by eliminating those individuals whose characteristics appear to be at the extremes of acceptable measures of age, rank and experience. This procedure obviously makes no pretense at scientific exactness, but in spite of its arbitrary nature, should carry a reasonable degree of credibility when considering

the following criteria.

In evaluating the probabilities of Soviet military succession, a set of criteria similar to that of Grey Hodnett in Soviet Succession Contingencies has been employed.¹⁸ It must again be emphasized that the difficulties and uncertainties involved in this task are further complicated by such factors as the closed nature of Soviet society, and the influence of political dictates in relation to military leadership succession. Thus forewarned as to the speculative nature of this task, a more critical review of probable candidates to replace Marshal Grechko eliminates certain individuals from serious consideration and concurrently focuses attention on a more workable selection.

The process of eliminating from this initial listing those individuals whose present rank and/or position indicates a present insufficiency of responsibility in terms of absolute military and political leadership assists the author in focusing subsequent attention on those military leaders who display the very highest qualifications and background. However, no matter how simple such a process may appear, utmost care must be employed in analyzing available and basic data before eliminating possible successors. Working from this position, the following individuals have been eliminated from consideration based on the rather inflexible requirements of sufficient rank, age, importance of current assignment, and experience, or a combination thereof: Colonel General Gelovani, Colonel

General Govorov, Colonel General Salmanov, Colonel General Altunin, Colonel General Alekseev, General of the Army Ivanovskii, General of the Army Ogarkov and Marshal of the Soviet Union Moskalenko (who is, incidentally, a year older than Grechko). The elimination of these eight individuals from consideration as a successor to Marshal Grechko casts absolutely no aspersions on the careers and accomplishments of any of these senior military officers. Rather, their elimination serves to realistically assist in identifying the one individual who will most probably become the next Soviet Minister of Defense.

Continuing this process of eliminating those individuals least likely to replace Marshal Grechko, and applying basically the same criteria to those officers remaining, although from a more critical point of view, permits the elimination of a second group. Obviously, these second eliminations become even more difficult and possibly more arbitrary. Nonetheless, one can seek encouragement in the fact that a similar screening could theoretically be applied to any one of the world's military leaderships with generally favorable results.

This second group of officers is composed of General Sokolov, Marshal Batitskii, Marshal Kutakhov, Admiral Gorshkov, General Pavlovskii and General Kurkotkin. Each of these officers with the exception of General Sokolov, is presently a Deputy Minister of Defense on Grechko's staff, and a Commander-in-Chief of a particular branch of

the Soviet Armed Services. General Sokolov is the other First Deputy Minister of Defense (with Kulikov and Yakubovskii) and General Kurkotkin is Commander of the Rear Services.

The elimination of this second group of highly qualified senior officers requires a more detailed explanation than the first group elimination. General Sokolov (born 1911) is a contemporary of Marshal Yakubovskii (born 1912), and has served as one of three First Deputy Ministers of Defense (along with Kulikov and Yakubovskii) since 1967 - the same year Grechko was appointed Minister of Defense. In spite of having commanded the Leningrad military district (1965-67), General Sokolov's past assignments and current position indicate that he is a less desirable candidate than the other two First Deputy Ministers of Defense.¹⁹

The Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, General Pavlovskii, was also appointed during 1967. He has had sufficient experience to warrant further promotion but was not moved to Chief of the General Staff when Kulikov assumed that post in 1971. Marshal Batitskii has served in various ground and air-related commands but has failed to progress to positions comparable to those of his former comrade-in-arms, Marshal Yakubovskii. In 1972, General Kurkotkin was appointed Chief of the Rear Services and is, therefore, along with General Tolubko (Strategic Rocket Forces), one of the more junior staff members. This fact,

plus his present position, weigh heavily against his candidacy.²⁰

Finally, Admiral Gorshkov and Chief Marshal of Aviation Kutakhov, represent two extremely popular and heroic figures of the Soviet military. Admiral Gorshkov has commanded the Soviet Navy since 1956; this after a varied and exciting career. Marshal Kutakhov is a combat pilot with credit for 367 combat missions in World War II and 14 individual kills of enemy aircraft. However, the inclination of the Politburo to select a Defense Minister from the ground forces is considered to be overwhelming, even with the importance given the Soviet Navy in recent years.²¹

These comments highlight only the main reasons for non-consideration of the above mentioned officers. A more comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this paper.

(Note: The possibility exists that the Politburo may opt to select a successor to Marshal Grechko from the political and/or civilian sector. However, three factors appear to negate serious consideration of this option. They are (1) the demands exerted on military leadership by modern technology and the complex world situation, (2) the present organization of the Politburo, in which political control is exerted over the military in the presence of and with the active participation of the senior military authority and (3) the possibility of a provocative affront to a military establishment which in recent years has grown more

and more powerful and influential.)

Therefore, brevity dictates the final listing of primary candidates to replace Marshal Grechko must include only Marshal Yakubovskii, General Kulikov and possibly General Tolubko. The rationale for naming these three individuals is as varied as it is extensive, but primarily consists of the following considerations. Age is a critical factor when considering a senior staff of fourteen members whose age averages over 67 years. It is true that Marshal Grechko was 64 when appointed Defense Minister in 1967. However, his controversial appointment may have been influenced by a variety of factors, such as his personal relationship with Brezhnev. The three individuals identified for special consideration were chosen primarily on the basis of age, rank, seniority, current position, previous assignments, and the apparent Soviet disposition to select its senior military leader from ground forces commanders. Each of these officers carry the highest qualifications for selection as Minister of Defense.

Marshal Yakubovskii's candidacy gives the initial impression of being dominant. Since 1967, he has been First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. He is a member of the Party Central Committee and was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet 6th through 9th sessions. He has commanded armored forces at all levels, and during World War II, participated in the storming of Berlin and the liberation of Prague. Marshal

Yakubovskii has been Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Troops in Germany and Commander of the Kiev Military District. Finally, he has been twice awarded "Hero of the Soviet Union".²²

General Kulikov is a "fast-rising star" in the Soviet military hierarchy. He became Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense in 1971. Also in 1971, he became a member of the Party Central Committee, and was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet 7th through 9th sessions. During World War II, he rose through various commands to become Chief of Staff of a tank brigade, later serving as Commander of an army. General Kulikov became Commander of the Kiev Military District in 1967, and Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Troops in Germany in 1969. The rapid rise of General Kulikov seems to indicate that he has had a powerful sponsor. Unfortunately, not enough is known about the inner relations of ranking individuals nor General Kulikov's early career to give any clues as to the factual existence or true identity of this alleged sponsor.²³

General Tulubko may properly be considered a "dark horse" candidate in succession considerations. He became Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense in 1972. General Tolubko commanded the Siberian Military District from 1968-69, and the Far Eastern Military District from 1969-72. During World War II, he rose to become a tank brigade commander, and

after the war progressed to the position of First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces from 1960-68. He has been a member of the Party Central Committee since 1971, and was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet for two sessions.²⁴

The following table presents important qualifications of the three most probable candidates.

	<u>Age</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Present Position</u>	<u>Member CC</u>	<u>Past Assignments</u>
Grechko	73	MSU	Minister of Def (1967)	1961	C-in-C Warsaw Pact C-in-C GSFG* C-in-C Ground Forces C-in-C Kiev Military Dist
Yakubovskii	64	MSU	C-in-C Warsaw Pact 1st Dep Min Def (1967)	1967	C-in-C Kiev Mil Dist C-in-C GSFG*
Kulikov	55	GEN	Chief Gen Staff 1st Dep Min Def (1971)	1971	C-in-C Kiev Mil Dist C-in-C GSFG*
Tolubko	62	GEN	C-in-C Strat Rkt Forces Dep Min Def (1972)	1971	C-in-C Siberian Mil Dist C-in-C Far East Mil Dist

* GSFG - Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the careers and assignments of Marshal Grechko and Marshal Yakubovskii have been closely linked, especially since their respective appointments to their current positions - both in 1967. It would seem only natural and logical to assume that Marshal Yakubovskii would be appointed Grechko's replacement and move to Minister of Defense from First Deputy Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, much the same as Grechko did in 1967, after having served in the Warsaw Pact post for seven years (1960-1967). This precedent may in fact hold true and would, of course, come as no surprise.

As an alternative possibility, the younger General Kulikov may be appointed Minister of Defense in the event that Marshal Yakubovskii elected to join his Comrade Grechko in retiring for reasons of age.²⁵ General Tolubko enters consideration primarily because of the special consideration given rocket forces and missiles by Soviet leaders.

In the author's opinion, the most likely of all possibilities includes the retirement of Marshal Grechko in the near future, either accompanied by or followed shortly by the retirement of Marshal Yakubovskii, who may temporarily be appointed Minister of Defense. In all probability, General Kulikov should succeed to the post of Defense Minister, and a later scenario will likely include General Ivanovskii, the present Commander-in-Chief of Soviet

Troops in Germany, as Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. The rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union may be retained for only these two senior military positions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Unity and Contradiction in the Triangle of Dictatorship, Thesis. (United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, November, 1975) pp. 21-22.
2. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
3. Roman Kolkowicz, The Party and the Armed Forces, Thesis. (United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 8-10 June 1970), pp. 70-78.
4. Joseph P. Kerr, Current Party-Military Relations in the Soviet Union: Indicators of Increasing Military Influence. Thesis. (United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, May 1972), p. 2.
5. Interview and Class lecture by Dr. Abdurachman Kunta, Professor of Political Science, (U. S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, Germany, January, 1976.
6. Michel Gardner, A History of the Soviet Army (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1966), p. 140.
7. Ibid. pp. 140-152.
8. The Military Balance 1975-1976. (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies).
9. Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism, XXIV, (March-April 1975), pp. 1-21.
10. Kerr, pp. 2-3.
11. Hodnett, p. 8.
12. Ibid.
13. Peter N. Kruzhin, "Military Representation in the Party's Top Organs", Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, No. 654, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 8 June 1971).
14. "Grechko Might Quit, Sources Say", Stars and Stripes, October 3, 1974.)
15. "Top Leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces", Air Force Magazine, March 1975, p. 78.

16. Interview with Gregory M. Viktorov, Professor, U. S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, Germany, November 1975.

17. Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials, A74-1, (Reference Aid at U. S. Army Russian Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, January 1974).

18. Hodnett, p. 16.

19. "Top Leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces", Ibid.

20. Directory, Ibid.

21. "Kutakhov" and "Gorshkov", The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1974-75.

22. "Top Leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces", Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. The age of senior military leaders in the Soviet Armed Forces is apparently considered from a different point of view than that normally noted in Western armed forces. As has been noted, the average age of the 14 members of the Soviet senior staff exceeds 67 years. (Senior officers rarely serve much beyond 50 years of age in the American Army, for example). Marshal Yakubovskii's retirement at an age of 64 could be interpreted as somewhat unusual, but certainly understandable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Air Force Magazine, Vol. LVIII, No. 3, March 1973, pp. 33-78.
2. Avtorkhanov, A., Unity and Contradiction in the Triangle of Dictatorship. Symposium Paper given at the U. S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 30 October 1975.
3. Baranov, S. "Material'naia Osnova Moshchi Vooruzhen-nykh Sil SSSR" ("The Material Base of the Power of the USSR Armed Forces"), Red Star. 5 March 1971, p. 2.
4. Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Ehntsiklopediia. (Great Soviet Encyclopedia.) (Incomplete Set).
5. Conquest, Robert. Power and Policy in the USSR. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1967.
6. Dupuy, Trevor N., Ed. World Military Leaders, Dunn Loring, Virginia: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.
7. Erickson, John. Soviet Military Power. London: Royal United Services Institute, 1971.
8. Fainsod, Merle. How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
9. Gardner, Michel, A History of the Soviet Army. London: Pall Mall Press, 1966.
10. Hodnett, Grey. "Soviet Succession Contingencies", Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIV, March-April 1975, pp. 1-22.
11. Hoffman, Fred S. "Grechko Might Quit, Sources Say", Stars and Stripes, October 3, 1974.
12. "Honor to the Soviet Army", Red Star, 22 February 1975, and 23 February 1974.
13. Horelick, Arnold and Rush, Myron. Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
14. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1975-76. London, 1975.
15. Ivanovskii, E. "30 Let Na Peredovom Rubezhe" (30 Years on the Front Line)", Voennyi Vestnik, No. 6, June 1975, pp. 8-14.

16. Kerr, Joseph P. Current Party-Military Relations in the Soviet Union: Indicators of Increasing Military Influence. Thesis. U. S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, May, 1972.
17. Khrushchev, N. Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.
18. Kolkowicz, Roman. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
19. "Minister of National Defense in the Soviet Union", Red Star, 3 October 1975, p. 1.
20. Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich: 1966-67, Nos. 1-180.
21. Reference Aid, Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials - A74-1, January 1974.
22. Scott, Harriett F. "New Soviet Defense Minister", Military Review, Vol. 47, No. 7, July 1967, pp. 33-36.
23. Stasenko, N. "Torzhestvennoe Sobranie Uchastnikov Parada". ("Ceremonious Meeting of Parade Participants"), Krasnaia Zvezda, 3 November 1971, p. 1.
24. Tremain, Rose. Stalin. New York: Random House, Inc., May 1975.
25. United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 2nd thru 9th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium, Garmisch, Germany, 1968-75.
26. Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970.